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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

_MAl-HICE CHARLE8 GHARVOZ,
Ad1ninistrator of the Estate of
:MAURICE BRUCE CiiARVOZ,
Deceased,
Plaint~!!

and Appellant,

Case No.
9334

vs.

\YEXDELL L.

COTTRELL~

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the
defendant, Wen dell L. Cottrell, and against the plaintiff,
and from the Court's subsequent order denying the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. In view of the fact
that the plaintiff has failed to include several facts the
defendant deems important to his case, we make our own
statement of facts.
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Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action for the
death of 11:aurice Bruce Charvoz, age 25, arising out of
an accident that occurred on October 26, 1959, at about
7:00p.m. at the intersection of 17th South and 19th East
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was dark at the time
of the accident (R. 83, 123).
17th South is a blacktop highway running East and
West. 19th East is a blacktop highway running north
and south. The intersection is guarded by stop signs
facing traffic approaching from the north and south
on 19th East (R. 64). 17th South Street is curbed and
guttered on both sides. 19th East is curbed and guttered
on both sides south of the intersection but only on the
west side north of 17th South (R. 126, 127), and silt and
gravel were washed frmn this area, not curbed, into the
intersection, and on portions to the west of it, by storms
( R. 125, Exh. D-2, D-3).
There were painted crosswalks on all sides of the
intersection (R. 65). At the time of the accident the
decedent was crossing the intersection frmn north to
south within the· painted crosswalk on the west side of
the intersection (Exh. A). There was a street light on
the southwest corner of the intersection hanging from a
utility pole but the intersection was dimly lit (R. 85, 86).
17th South on the west side of the intersection was nleasured by the investigating officer to be 37'2" wide from
curb to curb with a line dividing the highway 20'8" from
the north curb and 16'6" from the south curb (R. 70, 71).
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There wa8 a car stopped on the north side of the
intersection at the stop sign facing directly south (R. 86)
with its lights on occupied by witnesses, Ford D. Crandall
and his wife (R. 83). On the northeast corner of the
intersection was a ten-acre vacant field (R. 125, 131,
Exh. D-2).
The weather was clear, the roads dry (Exh. A).
The decedent was walking across the west pedestrian
lane frmn north to south with his head down (R. 88, 128)
at the time of the accident. He was dressed in dark
clothing (R. 88, 127, 147).
~Ir.

Cottrell was driving east on 17th South in the
south lane of traffic at a speed of 30-35 miles per hour
(R. 69, 141, 142) with his lights on low beam (R. 146).
He had just come from the Secretary of State's office
where he had been in a business meeting (R. 133). When
he ·was about 60-65 feet from Bruce, l\.fr. Cottrell saw
hin1 and in1mediately applied his brakes (R. 124, 136)
and apparently pulled to the right causing his car to
veer to the right (R. 129). He did not have time to sound
his horn (R. 130, 131). When Mr. Cottrell first saw
Bruce, Bruce was about to the line dividing the high·way (R. 127). He thereafter took two steps, colliding
with the left bumper and headlight rim of the defendant's
car (Exh. D-6, D-7). The decedent was thrown up on
the fender and carried to about the center of the intersection where he rolled off. Defendant's car traveled
over to the west line of the crosswalk on the east side
of the intersection (Exh. D-6). The probable point of
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impact between the defendant's car and Bruce was measured by the officer to he about 6'3" south of the center
dividing line of the highway.
The defendant's vehicle left the following skid marks
as 1neasured by Officer Diaz :
Before I1npact

Total

R.F. 12'8"
L.F. 14'2"
L.R. 9'8"
R.R. 20'±"

69' 3"
70' 9"
66' 4"
76'11"

The two right wheels skidded through gravel and
silt and the left wheels skidded on some silt (R. 127, Exh.
D-2, D-3). About two days after the accident occurred
the investigating officer n1ade one skid test \Yhere the
highway was free from silt or gravel. On the basis of
the coefficiency of friction determined on this test, but
using defendant's skid marks through the gravel and
silt, he came up with a speed of ±2 miles per hour for
defendant's car. However, as plaintiff has stated in his
brief, the question of speed is not an issue.
Before the investigating officer arrived at the scene
of the accident, Bruce Charvoz was taken to the Salt
Lake County Hospital. 'Vhile there, on the night of the
accident, he had a conversation with his mother and one
of the police officers in which he stated to his mother
that he didn't see the defendant's car (R. 116, 117).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
·THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IN REGARDS TO THE
DOCTRINE OF LAS'T CLEAR CHANCE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give his
requested instruction No. 2· which reads as follows:
''You are instructed that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law that the defendant was
negligent and that his negligence proximately contributed to the death of the decedent, therefore,
you should find the issues of liability against the
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff unless
you should also find that the decedent was contributorily negligent and that such negligence on
the part of the decedent proximately contributed
to his death."
This instruction contains two basic premises : One
that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of
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law and, two, that said negligence was a proximate cause
of the accident and decedent's resulting death.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence was undisputed
that defendant \vas guilty of negligence as a maUer of
law in two respects: (a) That defendant failed to keep
a proper lookout and (b) ·The defendant failed to yield
the right of way to the decedent.
Plaintiff's claim of negligence upon the part of the
defendant in failing to keep a proper lookout is based
upon two theories: (1) That defendant did not see the
decedent until he was 60-65 feet from him, and (2) That
under Sec. 41-6-134 Sub. (b) U.C.A., 1953, one is required
to have lights which will on low beam reveal persons
and vehicles at a distance of at least 100 feet ahead and
that therefore defendant is negligent if he didn't see
decerlP-nt at a distance of 100 feet.
The undisputed testimony in this case is that the
decedent was dressed in dark clothing and that he was
walking across a blacktop street with a dark backdrop
on the northeast corner (R. 125, 131, Exh. D-2). It is
common knowledge that dark clothing against the background of the dark blacktop street and of the dark northeast corner of the intersection would make it very difficult for the defendant to observe· the decedent as he
crossed the highway, and particularly so until he came
into the proximity of the· direct center of the beam of
defendant's headlights. For example, in the photograph
Exhibit D-2 on file in this case, the clothing of the officer
clearly shows this principle. The officer's black boots
blend in with the blacktop of the highway so that ,~t is
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hard even in the pieture to discern where the blacktop
ends and his boots begin. The same is true of the officer's dark coat with respect to the dark background on
tlw northeast corner of the intersection. However, the
officer's white hat and his light trousers are n1ore easily
discernible.
The fact that there was a car stopped at the intersection which the defendant observed and had a duty to
watch was also a distracting influence which would
require defendant's attention and take part of his concentration at the intersection.
Whether under all of the circumstances surrounding this accident the defendant was guilty of negligence
in failing to see the decedent before he did was certainly
a jury question and defendant could not be held guilty
of negligence as a matter of law in £.ailing to observe
him before he actually did. See 2A Blashfield Cycl. of
.Atttomobile Law & Practice, Sec. 1256 at page 155 in
which the rule is stated:
" ... that a motorist equipped with statutory
headlights does not observe a pedestrian in dark
clothing walking in the road ahead of him until
the moment before striking him is not necessarily
conclusive of the negligence of the motorist; the
question of his negligence under the particular
circumstances usually being one of fact."
Thus in the case of Falnes vs. Kaplan, Fla. 101 So.
(2) 377 where a motorist was traveling at a moderate
speed and did not discover a pedestrian clothed in a
dark blue uniform and walking on the black asphalt
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surface of a roadway at midnight until he was but 10
feet from him, the Court held the motorist could not be
liable, eve:r; under the last clear chance doctrine.
The defendant saw the lights of the vehicle of the
"\\ritness Crandall before he saw the decedent and he
testified that he was looking directly ahead along the
roadway. This evidence indicates that he was keeping
a proper lookout.
Defendant does not argue with the principle of law
set forth in the case of Frarnk v. McCarthy, Utah 1948,
188 P. (2) 737 cited by the plaintiff but does claim that
the factual situation existing in plaintiff's case is substantially different than that which existed in the Frank
case and that reasonable minds would be warranted in
reaching the conclusion that Mr . .Cottrell was not negligent in the operation of his vehicle.
Sec. 41-6-78 UCA 1953, provides that the driver of
a vehicle shall yield the right of \vay, slowing down or
stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing
the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is
upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle
is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so
closely fron1 the opposite half of the roadway, as to be in
danger, but no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb
or other place of safety and walk or run into the path
of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for
the driver to yield.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on this
provision of the statute and the respective duties of the
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pedestrian and driver.
:Mr. Cottrell testified that when he first saw the
<lPeP<lent, the decedent was then approaching the center
line. At that time he immediately applied his brakes and
attempted to stop but he was so close that it was impossilde for hin1 to do so. If Bruce had been keeping a
proper lookout, he would have seen the nearness of the
defendant's automobile, stopped short of the center line,
or the path of defendant's vehicle, and no accident would
have occurred. After the defendant saw him, Bruce
moved some six feet or more into the path of the defendant's car leaving his place of safety north of the center
line.
In the case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah (2d) 381,
275 Pac. (2d) 680, the Court had before it a case very
similar to our case. In that case the plaintiff was walking from east to west across Washington Boulevard in
Ogden, Utah, within a marked crosswalk, at night, between 26th and 27th Streets when she was struck by a
motorist driving south on Washington Boulevard. The
plaintiff had crossed to the center of Washington Boulevard and stopped to look to the north for cars from that
direction. Seeing none, she proceeded west into the
southbound lanes of traffic a few steps when she was
struck. The defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff at all, his first warning of the accident being the
sound of the impact of defendant's car against plaintiff.
The court in this case, Justice Crockett speaking,
stated at Page 390 :
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"Consistent with his duty of refusing to take
questions of fact from juries except in cases free
frmn doubt, the trial court properly submitted the
questions as to defendant's negligence, plaintiff's
contributory negligence, and proximate cause to
the jury."
In discussing the right of way rule, the Court stated:
"The right of way rule simply means this;
that if two persons are so proceeding that if they
continued their course there W'ould be danger of
collision, the disfavored one must give way and
the favored one may assume that this will be done.
It is, of course, recognized that the right of way
rule would not apply, iJf when the faV'ored one
approached the crosstng potnt, the disfavored one
was so close that in due care he could not or
should not reasonably be expected to give way."
(Emphasis ours).
This is the situation that existed at the time Bruce
Charvoz started into the eastbound lane of traffic on
17th South Street. At the time Mr. Cottrell first saw
Bruce 60-65 feet away, Bruce was on the north side of
the center line of the highway and Mr. Cottrell was then
so close to the point of crossing that he was unable to
stop. In fact, if he had not applied his brakes, it is quite
likely that the accident may have been averted because
the impact involved only the left front bumper and left
headlight of the Cottrell car, and this after Mr. Cottrell
had slowed his vehicle after the application of brakes.
It seems clear that the vehicle was an immediate hazard
to the pedestrian at the time Bruce crossed the center
line and perhaps for a few steps to the north thereof.
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Under the facts of the case now before this court
and this court's decision in the Coombs v. Perry and
other Utah decisions, it appears clear that the question
of the defendant's negligence, as well as the plaintiff's
negligence, with regard to lookout and right of way was
by the trial judge properly submitted to the jury.
Where the trial judge has passed upon a
question and the jury, presumably fair and impartial, has made a finding, while such is not controlling, it is at least entitled to some consideration and should not be wholly ignored on appeal
in determining whether reasonable minds might
so conclude. In determining on appeal whether
the questions of negligence and -contributory negligence were pro perly submitted to the jury, the
reviewing court must review the evidence, together with every inference fairly arisring therefrom, in the light most favorable to the prevailing
p.arty and must consider any lack or failure of
any evidence in the same light. (Coombs v. Perry,
1

~nfra.)

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IN REGARDS TO THE
DOCTRINE OF LAS'T CLEAR CHANCE.

The plaintiff's requested instruction No. 13 was an
attempt to have the court apply the last clear chance
doctrine to the case. The theory was that the plaintiff
was in a position of danger from which he was unable
to free himself, that the defendant either discovered or
by exercise of due care should have discovered his peril
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and at that time had a clear opportunity to avoid the
accident but failed to avail himself of such opportunity.
Under the facts as presented in this case, the court properly refused the requested instruction.
The undisputed testimony is that the decedent in
this case took several steps from a position north of
the center line ·of the highway to the point of impact
without looking to the right to ascertain whether any
cars were approaching; that he was dressed in dark
clothing and that the defendant did not see him until he
was within 60-65 feet of the decedent who at that time
was north of the center line of the highway. Defendant
at that time was traveling about 30 miles per hour. As
soon as defendant saw decedent come into the cone of
light projecting from his automobile he instinctively
applied his brakes but struck defendant with his left
front headlamp.
In the case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346,
166 Pac. (2d) 230, cited by plaintiff in his brief, Justice
Wade in his concurring opinion at page 364 in analyzing
one version of the facts, stated: ''I do not believe that
the jury could reasonably find that Gary moved at most
more than three or four running steps after the warning
was shouted to him before he collided with the car. Coming unexpectedly as this warning shout did, it would
take some time after Gary started running before Darlene could discern that he was moving toward the path
of her car and apprise her that he was in danger, and
it would take further time thereafter for her to start to
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try to sound her horn or apply her brakes. Whatev·er
acUon. she took drurhzg that tifme would b·e the rest~;lt of
reflex action r.ather than deliberation and cl(!)ar thinking.
U 1Uler such circttmstances, the last clear chanoe doctrine
has no aJJprication. That doctrine cont·emplates th(J)t after
one party has placed himself in a periJlous position there
is a clear cha;noe on the part of the other party to avoid
the accident." (Emphasis added.)
So in the present case, Mr. Cottrell, after he discovered the presence of the decedent, had no clear chance
to avoid the accident. His action in applying his brake~
was reflex action rather than deliberation and clear
thinking.
There is some evidence that defendant may have
been somewhat closer than 60 feet at the time of his first
observation. If defendant was traveling at 30 miles per
hour, during the normal reaction time of 3/4 seconds,
he would have traveled 33 feet. Add this to 14 feet, the
longest front skid mark, and we have 47 feet as the
approximate distance from impact at which defendant's
vehicle was located when he was first able to observe
the decedent. The defendant could not at this distance
have stopped his vehicle in time to avoid the accident
if the decedent continued his pace into the path of
defendant's vehicle.
Plaintiff has set out in his brief the six propositions
that must be met by the evidence in order for the jury
to apply the doctrine of last clear chance. We do not
argue with the propositions set forth in the instruction
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pertaining to the doctrine as applied to a negligently
inattentive plaintiff but do claim that the facts did not
exist which would justify the submission of the case to
the jury under that doctrine.
Our Supre1ne Court, in commenting upon the application of the last clear chance doctrine in the case of
Graham v. Johnson, supra., in the course of its opinion
said:
''In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's
negligence has become in a sense fixed and realizable and on to this state of things defendant
approaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and
in control of the danger.

*

*

*

"One should not be held liable for failing to
avoid the ·effect of the other's negligence iln a
situation where it is spec~tlative as to ~chether he
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In
a situatiJon where both parties are on the move
the significance of the wor:d 'clear' is most important. Otherwvse we may put the onus of .avoiding
the effect of one's neglvgenoe on a party not negligent. That party's negligence only arises when
it is definitely established that there was ample
time and opportunity to avoid the accident which
was not taken advantage of." (Emphasis added.)

The facts in the Graham case were son1ewhat in
dispute, but it was clear that the defendant in that case
knew of the presence of the minor on the street as she
approached and also knew that the 1ninor was unaware
of her approach. It was als·o clear that the defendant
had plenty of time and a clear opportunity to take action
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to avoid the accident. Each of these items is lacking in
the present case. The defendant testified that decedent
had his head down at the time he· first saw him just north
of the center line. However, defendant did not know
whether the decedent had looked for defendant's car just
before, or at any tilne before defendant saw him, or
whether he would look again. Defendant didn't wait to
find out. Instead he took immediate action to avoid the
accident. He testified as follows:
Q. "As you approached the place where the
accident occurred, state what you observed.

A. "vVell, as I approached 19th East all of
a sudden I saw this object almost in front of my
car, and just as quickly as I saw hi1n I threw on
1ny brakes." (Record 124, Line 15).
And again Record 130, Line 30 :

Q. "Now, did you make any attempt to
sound your horn at that time~"
A.

"No, sir, I did not, there wasn't time."

Again on cross examination of Mr. Cottrell, he testified
that when he saw Bruce he did the natural reaction and
hit his brakes. (Record 140, Line 5 and Record 141, Line
12). Also, Mr. Cottrell thought the decedent would stop.
(Record 140, Line 21).
Referring again to Graham v. Johnson, at Page 368,
we quote from the court's opinion:
"Where the situation is, to reasonable minds,
so doubtful as to whether the second party had
time to avoid it, the matter should not be given
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to the jury; otheTwise, we are, as said in the case
of Thomas v. Sadleir, 108 Utah 552, 162 Pac.
( 2d) 112, 115, in grave danger of peTmitting the
one really at " ... fault to shift the blame for the
accident on the other by accentuation of the
other's duty to avoid the effect of the first one's
negligence.''
And the court further goes on to state that the opportunity to avoid the accident must not be a mere possibility but a clear opportunity. And it must appear
t·o the court that the situation was such when the relative positions of the parties were changing with fair
rapidity that the element of doubt as to whether one of
them had an opportunity to avoid the accident and therefore a duty to do so must not be great. The peril in the
present case when the defendant discovered the decedent
was too imminent for an application of the last clear
chance doctrine. As a 1natter of fact the decedent could
at any time up to the actual instant of impact have
avoided the accident by stopping suddenly, and he in
fact had the better opportunity to avoid the accident.
The plaintiff relies upon the case of M orby v.
Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 Pac. (2d) 231. However, the
facts in that case were entirely different than those in
the present case. The· defendant had first observed the
boy on a bicycle traveling in the same direction as the
car when the defendant was 300 feet avray. At a distance of 200 feet the defendant sounded his horn. The
boy on the bicycle at no time gave any indication that
he heard the horn. The defendant continued on until
within 78 feet of the boy, but actually took no safety
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measures until within 20 feet of the boy, notwithstanding
the fact that at the speed at which he was traveling he
could have stopped within 43 feet, or 35 feet short of
striking the boy. The boy in that case for a distance of
300 feet was entirely in the lane of travel in which the
automobile was proceeding. The decedent in our case
was not in the lane of travel of the automobile until just
an instant before the impact occurred. Using the· normal
stopping distance, including reaction and braking time
at 30 miles per hour, by no stretch of the imagination
can it be argued that the defendant in the instant case
had any such distance or time as was present in the
Morby case within which to react after the decedent
moved into the path of the defendant's car.
The case of Compton v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co.,
120 Utah 453, 235 Pac. (2d) 515, was one in which the
principle which we believe applicable to our case was
announced by the court. In that case the plaintiff was
walking along the side of a railroad track as a train
approached. The court in that case in speaking of the
last clear chance doctrine, stated that it only applied:

"* * * only if the plaintiff's negligence has
0ome to rest .and plaintiff is thereafter unable
by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care
to avoid the injury herself. The deceased in this
case was not under those circumstances of inextricable peril. The fact is that at any rmstant
up to the ttme she was actually struck, she could
by the exercise of ordimary reasonable care, have
apprehended the presence of the train, and by
taktng one step to the side, have avoided her injury.'' (Emphasis added).
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Exactly the same situation is presented in the instant
case. Until the time that the decedent crossed in front of
the path of the defendant's vehicle, he could, by the
exercise of ordinary care, have observed the presence of
the automobile and yielded the right of vvay to it and
thereby completely avoided the aC'cident. The court in
the Compton case 1nade this further significant statement:

"We have never held that a mere conti~ntmwe
of the same ~nattentive negligence created a situation of ~nextricable peril. When the injured person's negligence has not come to rest, as it had
in the above cases, so that by the exercise of
reasonable care she would have been able to avoid
the peril at any time up to the moment of injury,
the injury is then the result of the concurring
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant.
The one was just as much the proximate cause
as the other. Ryan v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 46
Utah 530, 151 P. 71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139,
page 306, considers the situation of the negligent
defendant and the negligent plaintiff where the
defendant is unaware of plaintiff's peril and
states: "* * * It follows, thus, that the doctnne of
last cle:ar chance does not ~1telude cases ~n wh~ch
a plaintiff has the physical and mental abiUty
to avoid the risk up to the mom,ent of the harm.
His 'continuing' negligence, as it is sometimes
called, continues to insulate the defendant's negligence, and the ordinary rule of contributory negligence governs the case.' " (Emphasis added).
The decedent's negligence in this cas.e ~continued
right up to the point until he walked into the path of
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the car, and at this tiine the defendant had no clear
opportunity to avoid the accident.
In the case of Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah (2d) 174, 350
Pac. ( 2d) 154, the court had occasion to consider the
last clear chance doctrine in an accident involving an
autOinohile and a pedestrian which was very similar
to the f.aets in the caes before the court except that the
pedestrian was not -crossing in a marked crosswalk. We
quote from the court's opinion in that case:
''The plaintiff insists, however, that the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable and the
defendant should be held liable even if he did not
see her, because in the exer•cise of due care he
should have observed and avoided striking her.
This contention involves consideration of the other
frucet of the doctrine of last clear chance. Where
the defendant does not actually know of the plaintiff's situation of peril, the doctrine can only
properly be applied where the plaintiff has gotten
into a position of inextricable peril. An illustration of this is where a person has caught his foot
in a r.ailroad switch, or is in some other similar
predicament, so that he is thereafter unable to
avert the injury. In such a situation, the plaintiff's negligence has come to · rest. In such circumstances the defendant may be held responsible
if he either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable
care should know, of the plaintiff's helpless situation in time to avoid the injury and fails to do so.
In regard to the application of this principle,
the plaintiff here is faced with a dilemma: she
w.as either in inextricable peril or she was not.
If she was not in inextricable peril, then at any
instant up to the time she got into such predica-
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ment, by the exercise of reasonable care, she could
have observed the oncoming car and have avoided
being hit. On the other hand, she could only have
gotten into inextricable peril by getting into the
path of the defendant r s car, and her peril could
be considered inextricable only if the defendant
was then too close to avoid striking her. Thus,
by the very description of the situation, he did
not have the "last clear chance'' to .avoid the
injury. As the phrase indicates, it must be a fair
and clear opportunity and not a mere possibility
that the collision could have been .avoided. It is
our conclusion that the trial court was correct
in refusing to submit the case upon the doctrine
of last clear chance.''
It is apparent from a review of the foregoing Utah
cases that the doctrine of last clear chance is never
applicable until a plaintiff arrives at a point as to be
in peril. In this case the point was reached when the
decedent started to cross in front of the path of defendant's vehicle. It is also clear that the doctrine of last
clear chance should never he applied to the ordinary
case in which the accident creating the peril occurs
practically simultaneously with the happening of the
accident and in which neither party can be said to have
had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the consequence. If the defendant with a vehicle traveling 30
n1iles per hour had ,a last clear chance to avoid the
accident, then certainly it could be said with more force
and effect that the decedent had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident because all he needed to do w.as to
1nake an observation before he entered into the eastbound lane of traffic to observe the defendant's vehicle,
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at which ti1ne decedent could easily have stopped, whereas it takes son1e distance within which to stop a moving
vehicle. \V e, therefore, submit that the last clear chance
doctrine •cannot apply in any case where the defendant's
view is obstructed by darkness, glare, or other condition
which prevents him from seeing the plaintiff until he
enters the path of defendant's vehicle and particularly
in the case now before this court.
In 4Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law &
Practvce, Part 2, Sec. 2803, page 393 and 394, it is stated:

'' * * * While a pedestrian may be in .a zone
of danger as soon as he steps fron1 the sidewalk
to the street where vehicles are passing, he is not
then necessarily in danger from any particular
.automobile. Until he reaches a point where he is
in a position of peril from the automobile of the
defendant and further progress on his part or
other negligent conduct will not increase his danger, his negligence in proceeding forward can
only be regarded as a contributing proximate
cause of the injury.''
'Vhen defendant saw decedent some 6 ft. or more
from the point of impact defendant immediately applied
his brakes or sent the impulse to his foot to do so. It
was after that reaction on the part of the defendant that
decedent actually moved into the path of defendant's
vehicle. It was only after defendant had acted that decedent moved into a position of peril. The last clear chance
doctrine was therefore inapplicable.
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CONCLUSION
The case was properly submitted to the jury on appropriate instructions. The Court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law as requested in plaintiff's Instruction No. 2 and also properly refused to instruct
the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance as requested
by plaintiff in his Instruction No. 13.
We submit that plaintiff has had a fair trial under
appropriate instructions, that the trial Court did not
commit error in denying plaintiff's motion for a new
trial, and that the jury verdict and judgment entered
below should he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
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